Leopold first discusses the conservation of natural resources in the southwestern United States in economic tenns, stressing, in particular, erosion and aridity. He then concludes his analysis with a discussion of the moral issues involved, developing his general position within the context of P. D. Ouspenky’s early philosophy of organism.

Gathers the pre-Sand Country Almanac writings of Aldo Leopold, showing that he was not born an ecologist, but evolved over time through experimentation and thought.

Our century thinks scientifically. Nothing would be more plausible than that it has the same relation to the world as does Sein und Zeit. This, however, is not the case. For Heidegger, Science and Technology are essential characteristics of our time. Both are rooted in man insofar as he is a "Will to Will." Scientific man is man as subject. As such he does not wish to see the world the way it appears by itself but rather as a field (...) that may be tilled by him and is preordained for him and his activity. The world as the object of action does not merely come to man as a legacy; instead he violently grasps it and makes it his hunting ground. "Man becomes that Seiende, on which is based all Seiende in the manner of its Being and its Truth". Man of the machine-age does not allow for a world "where Being is as Being." The Subject "sets" its world and therefore has a Welt-bild and Welt-anschauungen, all of these being bifurcations indicating the separation of subject and world. A uniform world is replaced by Ego over against World. In this kind of "world" man makes God in his own image by setting the "world" as the stage for his Welt-anschauung, one which aims at utility and plasticity. Man is the director staging the world of his idea. As the objects which are handled have properties which reflect back on the producer, the directing is all the more dangerous. He who in everything that he thinks and does is staging himself might become the victim of his own production; the world of the calculating man has the character of its producer. "The calculating mind, adapting itself, invents 'values'. Value is the transformation of the Essence of Essence into the quantitative and the gigantic." In Holzwege Heidegger shows that the gigantic is a consequence of the way the subject places himself in the world. The world does not appear as what it is, but as what man makes of it. The world of the machine-age is a world-less world and the "world" as it is described in Sein und Zeit and more so in the essay "Vom Wesen des Grundes" does not appear in it. (shrink)

Consciousness and Qualia is a philosophical study of qualitative consciousness, characteristic examples of which are pains, experienced colors, sounds, etc.

ABSTRACTPeople's relationship between positive and negative affect varies on a continuum from relatively independent to bipolar opposites, with stronger bipolar opposition being termed affective bipolarity. Experiencing more depressive symptoms is associated with increased bipolarity, but the processes underlying this relation are not yet understood. Here, we sought to replicate this link, and to examine the role of two potential mediating mechanisms: emotion regulation ability, and trait brooding. Drawing from the Dynamic Model of Affect, we hypothesised that a poor ability to (...) regulate negative emotion, and the tendency to brood over one's depressed feelings would predict stronger affective bipolarity, and mediate the relationship between depressive symptoms and affective bipolarity. To measure affective bipolarity, we calculated within-person affect correlations using two weeks of experience sampling data from a community sample. Mediation analyses indicated that baseline assessments o... (shrink)

Given the apparent nondisplaceability and noncancellability of the derogatory content of slurs, it may appear puzzling that non-derogatory uses of slurs exist. Moreover, these uses seem to be in general available only to in-group speakers, thereby exhibiting a peculiar kind of context-sensitivity. In this paper the author argues that to understand non-derogatory uses we should consider slurs in terms of the kind of social practice their uses instantiate. A suitable theory of social practices has been proposed by McMillan. In typical (...) uses the practice is one of bigotry and discrimination. Non-derogatory uses are only possible to the extent that they consitute acts of an alternative, non-derogatory practice. In the core cases it must be a subversive practice of satire or reappropriation. The social identity of speakers is not an ultimately decisive factor but it is an important constitutive condition: most non-derogatory practices of slur-use can only be performed by a member of the target group. (shrink)

Most accounts of the derogatory meaning of slurs are semantic. Recently, Nunberg proposed a purely pragmatic account offering a compelling picture of the relation between derogatory content and social context. Nunberg posits that the semantic content of slurs is identical to that of neutral counterparts, and that derogation is a result of the association of slur use with linguistic conventions of bigoted speakers. The mechanism responsible for it is a special kind of conversational implicature. However, this paper argues that Nunberg’s (...) proposal suffers from technical and conceptual problems regarding the application of the concepts of implicature and convention. It is proposed that the implicature mechanism should be replaced by expressive commitment attribution. The account advocated here preserves crucial insights of Nunberg’s analysis, 25–48, 2013a, Analytic Philosophy 54, 350–363, 2013b; Bolinger Nous, 51, 439–462, 2017), giving them a firmer conceptual basis. It supports a distinction between derogation and offensiveness of slurs that improves on the one proposed by Hom and May, 293–313 2013), and sheds light on puzzling borderline cases: the use of slurs by ignorant speakers and controversies surrounding the status of some words as potentially slurs. (shrink)

This chapter examines art-historical classification and style-dating and evaluates their applications in establishing the connections between Ireland and Anglo-Saxon England during the seventh century. It describes the animals and plants in Christian objects and suggests that they are variants of the Germanic Animal Style II defined by Bernhard Salin. The chapter also argues that these objects reflect the relationships between the Anglo-Saxon and Irish ruling elites.

Leopold Flam (1912-1995) woont voor een groot deel van zijn jeugd in een kelder in Antwerpen. Zijn ouders, Joodse mensen die uit Lublin naar België emigreerden, kunnen lezen noch schrijven, en proberen aan de kost te komen met leuren en bedelen. Op zijn dertiende begint Flam met het bijhouden van een even openhartig als meedogenloos dagboek. Socrates indachtig heeft hij het vaste voornemen zichzelf te leren kennen. Het mag een klein mirakel heten dat Leopold Flam in zijn opzet (...) is geslaagd. Hij overleefde de Holocaust en hij, de bedelaarszoon, werd hoogleraar filosofie. Hij publiceerde artikelen en boeken, maar zijn dagboeken - voor zover bewaard - behoren tot zijn sterkste werk. Ze vormen een aangrijpend epos dat ons de mens Flam laat zien, eerder dan de filosoof. Tegelijkertijd bieden ze een verhelderend tijdsdocument, met onder meer concrete informatie over zijn hulp aan Joden tijdens de Duitse bezetting en notities gemaakt terwijl hij gevangenzat in Buchenwald. Ondanks de vooroordelen en vervolging waarmee hij had af te rekenen, bleef hij geloven in zijn weg uit de duisternis naar het licht."--Publisher information. (shrink)

This book offers a comprehensive treatment of the classical decision problem of mathematical logic and of the role of the classical decision problem in modern computer science. The text presents a revealing analysis of the natural order of decidable and undecidable cases and includes a number of simple proofs and exercises.

This paper offers a general model of the semantics of lexicalized social meanings, i.e. semiotic properties of certain expressions in a socio-political context. Examples include slurs, problematically charged expressions such as inner city, as well as terms such as mother, which also carry implicit ideological associations. Insofar as their linguistic properties are concerned, social meanings can be construed as context-structuring devices: without introducing specific at-issue contents, they evoke background assumptions which shape the context of conversation. An inferentialist model of discourse (...) is developed to account for this effect, in which the discursive significance of an utterance is defined as the set of inferences it licenses relative to a discursive context. A discursive context is a set of propositions that can serve as auxiliary premises in material inferences, together with a salience ranking that makes some of these propositions more readily available and therefore more relevant to determining discursive significance. Social meanings are defined as functions on discursive contexts that modify the salience ranking, increasing the salience of certain assumptions and stereotypes. As a result, they impact the discursive significance of utterances indirectly and independently of at-issue contents. They are also largely independent of speaker intentions in virtue of the ideological nature of discursive contexts. (shrink)

Die bedeutung der jüdischen feste nach Philo.--Der nomos. insonderheit Sabbat und feste, in philonischer beleuchtung, an der hand von Philos schrift De septenario.--Die religions- und kulturgeschichtliche stellung Philos.--Agada bei Philo.--Ursprung, begriff und umfang der allegorischen schrifterklärung.--Die alexandrinische lehre von den mittelwesen oder göttlichen kräften, insbesondere bei Philo, geprüft auf die frage, ob und welchen einfluss sie auf das mutterland Palästina gehabt.

In this paper I describe the place of naive realism in Russell’s changing accounts of perception. I argue ‎for the following conclusions: (1) The early period, 1898-1910: I am inclined to think that the naïve ‎realism that Russell embraced so enthusiastically early on may not have been intended as a naïve ‎realism about perception, but as a metaphysical or semantical thesis. (2) The Problems of Philosophy ‎‎(1912): Russell abandons naïve realism (if, in fact, he ever held it) and presents a (...) sense-datum version ‎of representative realism. (3) “On Matter” (1912): here we see Russell’s best attempt to defend ‎something very close to the standard doctrine of naïve realism. The objects of perception—the ‎‎“everyday material objects such as caterpillars and Cadillacs”—have, of course, undergone severe ‎reconstruction. But the resulting picture does capture the spirit of the doctrine. (4) The period from ‎‎1914 to 1927: though Russell’s thinking about perception underwent some significant changes during ‎this period—the sense datum theory is replaced by neutral monism—I try to show that the ‎distinction between the matter of physics and the thing of common sense is a constant feature of ‎Russell’s changing views. And I suggest that our perceptual relation the thing of common ‎sense (as logically reconstructed by Russell) can usefully be viewed as a limited sort of naïve realism. ‎‎(5) The period after 1927: the thing of common sense no longer features in Russell’s account of our ‎perceptual access to the world. The things we perceive are percepts, located in our private spaces. The ‎only material objects of which these percepts are parts are our brains. All other material objects are ‎beyond our perceptual reach and are accessible only via inference. This is the end of anything ‎resembling the traditional view of naïve realism in Russell’s account of perception. ‎. (shrink)